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Reynolds v. State: CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS 
DURING INTERROGATION 
MA Y BE ADMISSIBLE WHEN IN-
SPIRED BY ALTRUISTIC IN-
TENT. 
In Reynolds' v. State, 327 Md. 494, 
610 A.2d 782 (1992), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland refused to invali-
date a criminal defendant's testimony 
on the ground that his statements were 
induced by a police officer's assurance 
that they would result in the improved 
mental health of his daughter. In so 
ruling, the court of appeals reaffinned 
its position that confessions elicited by 
a defendant's sense of altruism do not 
mandate suppression. 
In 1989, Frederick William 
Reynolds, J r. (hereinafter "Reynolds") 
was confronted by several members of 
his family concerning his sexual abuse 
of two of his daughters. Reynolds con-
fessed and agreed to seek professional 
help. He sought treatment at a counsel-
ing center, where he was informed that, 
as a prerequisite to receiving treatment, 
Maryland law required him to sign a 
form authorizing the center to notify the 
police of any evidence implicating him 
as a child-abuser. Confused about his 
options, Reynolds telephoned the Carroll 
County State's Attorneys Office, where 
he spoke with an Assistant State's At-
torney who advised him to undergo 
counseling. She also infonned him that 
she could not provide him with further 
advice because she was responsible for 
prosecuting sexual abuse cases. Believ-
ing that he had no alternative to receiv-
ing treatment, Reynolds returned to the 
center and signed the authorization fornl. 
While receiving treatment, Reynolds 
voluntarily agreed to meet with Mary-
land State Police Officer Corporal Ri-
chard E. Norman (hereinafter 
"Norman"). At their first meeting, 
Reynolds was informed that he was not 
required to answer any questions he did 
not want to answer and he would not, at 
that time, be arrested. Despite such 
assu rances, Reynolds requested Nonnan 
to read him his Miranda rights. The 
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interview continued and Reynolds freely 
confessed to his previous criminal in-
cestuous behavior. 
After the meeting Nonnan contin-
ued his investigation by interviewing 
Reynolds' daughters. Following a 
lengthy discussion with Crystal, one of 
Reynolds' daughters, Nonnan sought a 
second interview with Reynolds, who 
agreed to meet. During this meeting, 
Reynolds was asked to corroborate state-
ments Nornlan had recently received 
from Crystal, one of Reynolds' daugh-
ters. After Norman suggested to 
Reynolds that verifying Crystal's state-
ments would ease his daughter's mental 
anguish, Reynolds answered Nonnan 's 
questions. Two days later, Norman re-
turned to Reynolds' home and arrested 
him on various charges of sexual of-
fenses conunitted upon his daughters. 
At trial, Reynolds made a motion to 
suppress those incriminating statements 
on the ground they were involuntary. 
The Circuit Court for Carroll County 
denied Reynolds' motion, finding 
Reynolds guilty of various sexual of-
fenses. On appeal, the court of special 
appeals affirmed the circuit court, and 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted Reynolds' writ of certiorari. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, Reynolds challenged the 
incriminating statements admitted at 
trial on both due process and conunon 
law grounds. ld at 503, 610 A.2d at 
785. The court of appeals acknowl-
edged that, in order to detennine whether 
a confession was voluntary, the consti-
tutional due process '''test is of the 
totality of the circumstances. All of the 
circumstances of the interrogation, and 
. the particular characteristics of the ac-
cused must be exanlined. Generally, no 
one factor is dispositive. '" ld at 503, 
610 A.2d at 786 (quoting D. Nissan et 
a!., Law (~r Confessions § 1:9 (1980 & 
Cum. Supp. 1991 ». The court also 
noted that a claim of involuntariness 
which deprived a criminal defendant of 
his due process rights cannot stand 
"[a]bsent police conduct causally re-
lated to the confession .... " ld at 504, 
610 A.2d at 786 (quoting Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986». 
Acknowledging that claims of in-
voluntariness may be brought under 
either constitutional due process or state 
evidentiary law, the court then looked to 
common law standards.ld at 504,610 
A.2d at 786. The court of appeals 
detennined that the common law ap-
proach required a more precise exami-
nation of the conduct leading up to a 
confession. ld. The court listed factors 
such as actual or threatened physical 
harm, promises not to prosecute, and 
promises ofleniency as possible indica-
tions of an invalid confession. Id. (cit-
ing W. LaFave and J. Israel, 1 Criminal 
Procedure §6.2, at 440 (1984». Not-
withstanding the difference between the 
conunon law approach and the consti-
tutional due process approach, the court 
recognized that Maryland common law 
looked to the "totality of the circum-
stances" as well. Reynolds, 327 Md. at 
504,610 A.2d at 787. 
The court then considered whether 
the Assistant State's Attorney improp-
erly induced a confession by instructing 
Reynolds to seek counseling.ld at 503, 
610 A.2d at 789. Although promises of 
leniency which induce defendants to 
admit their guilt are often encouraged 
by the court, these sanle assurances are 
discouraged when made by state agents 
during custodial interrogation. ld. at 
504,610 A.2d at 787. Thus, any such 
inducement on the Assistant State's 
Attorney's behalf would be disfavored 
by the court. The court found that the 
remarks did not promise a benefit or 
advantage to Reynolds in exchange for 
a confession, but actually served as a 
warning that Reynolds might be found 
criminally liable.ld at 510, 610 A.2d 
at 789. In addition, the court deter-
mined that even ifit found that Reynolds 
was improperly induced to seek coun-
seling, no evidence existed to support a 
finding that he was encouraged to speak 
to the police. ld. at 511, 610 A.2d at 
790. As such, the court found that under 
the totality of the circumstances there 
was no inducement. ld;. 
The court then addressed the issue 
of whether Norman's statements, re-
garding the mental health of Reynolds' 
daughter, were improper inducements. 
Reynolds' principle argument stemmed 
from Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155,423 
A.2d 552 (1980), wherein the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland invalidated a 
defendant's statements because he was 
promised that his wife would not be 
arrested and charged if he confessed. 
Reynold~, 327 Md. at 512,610 A.2d at 
790 (citing Stokes at 157,423 A.2d at 
553). As the court declared in Stokes, 
however, "[n]either Maryland nor any 
other jurisdiction of which we are aware 
goes so far as to say that a confession 
motivated by a defendant's sense of 
altruism, without inducement of an of-
ficial threat or promise, is involuntary." 
Reynolds, 327 Md. at 512,610 A.2d at 
790 (quoting Stokes at 162,423 A .2d at 
555). 
Comparing Stokes to the instant 
case, the court distinguished its deci-
sion by the fact that Stokes involved 
both a direct and a collateral benefit by 
which the defendant and a third party 
would benefit from the defendant's con-
fession. Reynolds, 327 Md. at512, 610 
A.2d at 790. In Reynolds, however, the 
cou rt found that the defendant's confes-
sion, which was given with no promise 
of legal advantage to the defendant or a 
third party, was merely an altruistic 
action on defendant's behalf.ld. at513, 
610 A.2d at 791. Accordingly, the court 
held that absent any promise or threat 
by the police, the mere fact that a crimi-
nal defendant believes his testimony 
will help a relative will not invalidate 
the statements. ld. 
Reynolds represents a tightening of 
the limits of inadmissible testimony in 
Maryland courts. By defining with 
greater precision what constitutes an 
improper inducement of a confession, 
the cou rt has settled the issue of whether 
an improper inducement is present where 
no direct personal legal benefit is gained 
through a defendant's confession. In 
addition, Reynolds signifies a trend 
which moves away from a per se exclu-
sion of testimony and toward an analy-
sis of the totality of the circumstances. 
Rather than focusing on specific state-
ments made to the defendant, this trend 
increases the importance of detem1in-
ing the impact of promises made to 
criminal defendants during interroga-
tion. 
-Michael D. Snyder 
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